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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

Daniel Ghormley appeals from his Judgment of Conviction for Rape. The theory of the
prosecution's case was that the sex occurred when the female involved was too intoxicated to
give valid consent. During the trial before a Jury, the woman involved testified on two occasions
that she thought she had been drugged. Because there was absolutely no basis in fact for this
allegation, the trial Judge ruled the statements inadmissible and prejudicial to the defendant,
instructed the jury to disregard the statements, but would not grant the defendant's requested
mistrial. In this appeal, Mr. Ghormley asks the Court to reverse the conviction and grant him a
new trial because the first trial was clearly unfair, as defined by Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1 and
the cases which have addressed this topic.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings

Mr. Ghormley was charged by criminal complaint in January of 2012 with the crime of
rape. It was alleged in that complaint, and in all subsequent pleadings, that Mr. Ghonnley had
sex with a woman at a time that she was unable to either resist the act or comprehend what she
was doing because she was too intoxicated or otherwise unconscious.
At trial, the woman, hereinafter referred to as A.H., testified that on the night in question,
she went out to a local bar to meet up with a friend and at the bar consumed alcohol. Tr., p. 37,
L. 17. She then went to another bar but did not feel comfortable driving there so she got a ride

with a friend. Tr., p. 40, L. 1. At the second bar, she met up with other friends and consumed
more alcohol. Tr., p. 41, L. 23. From that bar, she traveled with a 6rroup that included Mr .
Ghom11ey to a local store to get some food and more alcohol.

s
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., p. 45, L 1. From there, the

group went to Mr. Ghormley's house and played "drinking games." Tr., pp. 45-46, LL. 24-14.
During these drinking games, A.H. consumed more alcohol. Tr., p. 47, L. 13.
In the middle of all this, A.H. testified that she fell asleep sitting up against a couch in the
living room, while the others will still playing the game. Tr., p. 48, L. 11. At some point during
the evening, one or more members of the group woke A.H. and led here down to a spare room so
she could sleep for the rest of the evening. Tr., p. 49, L. 10. A.H. testified that when she woke
up (later in the spare room), someone was having sex with her. Tr., P. 53, L. 1. She could not
identify who it was that was having sex with her. Tr., p. 56, L. 24.
In response to the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney's question about how long she thought
the sex lasted, A.H. responded 'just a few seconds, you know. I mean, it-it was, I swear I was
drugged." Tr. P. 57, L. 5. (Emphasis added, obviously). In the course of the trial, A.H. testified

that she blacked out before from the effects of medication and has passed out before from the
effects of alcohol and knows the difference between the two. Tr., p. 73, L. 7. \\'hen asked by
defense counsel on cross-examination whether she was comfortable with her assessment that, on
the night in question, she was not passed out from alcohol, she answered "yes."

Tr., p. 73, L.

15. She then goes on, with no question put to her, to tell the jury "I personally think I was
drugged." Tr., p. 73, L. 17. At this point, defense counsel asked the Court to grant a mistrial.

The time was then about 3 :00 on the first day of trial, which included jury selection. Tr. p. 74, L.
4.
Judge Bevan, after considering argument and taking time to review the cases on point,
ruled that:
1)

The testimony/statement was not relevant. Tr. p. 85, L. 21.

2)

The testimony/statement ,vas more prejudicial to the defendant than
p. 85. L. 23.
probative.

s
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3)

The prejudice to the defendant could be cured with an instruction to the
jury. Tr., p. 86, L. 17.

The jury eventually found Mr. Ghormley guilty.

s

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the interjection of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence by the State's chief witness
deprive the defendant of a fair trial?

s
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ARGUMENT
Idaho Criminal Rule 29.l(a) provides a mechanism for the Court to correct a problem
which occurs during a trial that is so prejudicial to a defendant that starting over is the best way
to ensure the defendant receives a fair trial. That rule reads as follows:
At any time during a trial, the court may declare a mistrial and order a new trial of
the indictment, information or complaint under the following circumstances:
a.
Upon Motion of Defendant. A mistrial may be declared upon motion of the
defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or
conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the
defendant of a fair trial. When such an error, defect or conduct occurs during the joint trial of
two (2) or more defendants, and a mistrial motion is made by one or more, but not by all, the
court must declare a mistrial only as to the defendant or defendants making or joining in the
motion, and the trial of the other defendant or defendants must proceed.
When considering what this rule contemplates and requires, the trial court relied on the
cases of State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764 (Ct.App. 2012) and State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176
(Ct.App. 2011) for guidance. In Watkins, the Court of Appeals pointed out that it is not the trial
Judge's decision that is the focus of inquiry, but rather, in the context of the whole trial, was the
error one that requires reversing the conviction and ordering a new trial. The standard for when
an error amounts to one requiring reversal is whether the reviewing Court cannot find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
The specific facts in Watkins require some examination so that the context of that ruling
may be understood.

There, a pre-trial order had been issued by the trial court essentially

dictating that no mention should be made by any witness about the defendant's prior conviction
and successful appeal in the very case at trial. Vv'hile on the witness stand, a police officer
testified in front of the jury that he had read the transcript of his prior testimony in the first trial
after the appeal. It looks like the trial Judge, on

s

own, called an immediate recess to address

the violation and what remedies, including a possible mistrial, should be explored. Both the trial
Court and the Court of Appeals on review focused on the very precise wording of what the
officer had said. Because he had not said prior "conviction" but had only said prior "trial", both
Courts reasoned that the jury could have just as easily guessed the State, rather than the
defendant, lost the first trial.

Without actually saying so, this line of reasoning essentially

amounts to a finding that the evidence is not really prejudicial at all.

In fact, the Court of

Appeals seemed ready to agree with most other states that if the officer had said "conviction"
rather than "trial", the error would be such that a fair trial would have been presumed to be
impossible and a new trial granted without further analysis.
In Norton, the error complained of was a statement made by a witness at trial which
implicated the defendant in a prior arson in another state. The Court there gave a curative
instruction which not only included instruction on the law, but also conveyed factual information
not otherwise produced at trial. The Judge in the case instructed the jury that the other fire had
been investigated by proper authorities and they had determined the fire to have been started by
an electrical short and not deliberately by anyone is a huge affirmative step toward the goal of
having the jury forget they ever heard the evidence in the first place. Comparing that curative
instruction to the one given by Judge Bevan in Mr. Ghormley' s case really highlights the
distinction between the two cases and draws into closer focus the actual prejudice suffered by
Mr. Ghonnley. Although Judge Bevan only played the cards he was dealt by A.H., he could not
do much more with a curative instruction than what he eventually came up with, which was
basically "forget she said that and that we have made a big deal of it." If, for example, there
would have been specific forensic toxicology perfonned on A.H. 's blood or urine ,vhich
conclusively proved that no

s

rape drug was found, and Judge Bevan so infom1ed the jury as

part of his curative instruction, then everybody, including Mr. Ghormley, should have been
satisfied that the jury would not speculate further about whether A.H. was actually administered
some kind of drug. This scenario closely tracks what the Court was able to do in Norton. But
Judge Bevan could not do that here and the best he could do, short of granting a mistrial, was to
try to put the toothpaste back into the tube, un-ring the bell, or whatever analogy the Court
wishes to use. One of the earliest reported legal references to un-ringing a bell can be found in

State v. Rader, 62 Ore. 37; 124 P. 195, (1912), where it was said at page 40:
While in some cases an express instruction to the jury to disregard
testimony injuriously admitted is properly held to cure the error, yet the courts are
cautious in the application of this rule. It is not an easy task to unring a bell, nor to
remove from the mind an impression once firmly imprinted there, and the
withdrawal of the testimony should be so emphatic as to leave no doubt in the
mind of the juror as to the unequivocal repudiation by the court of the erroneously
admitted matter, and even then, in a case where the testimony is evenly balanced
or contradictory, courts hesitate to sanction such withdrawal, though it seems
absolutely necessary to permit this course in some instances.

The effect on the jury of the way this evidence came out at trial is what this Court is now
responsible for determining, but two specific points need to be stressed. First, because this trial
really boiled down to the testimony of the State's main witness, who also happened to be the
complainant, anything she has to say about the facts with necessarily be amplified tenfold.
Second, the unsolicited nature of the comments should leave this Court with questions about
A.H.'s true purpose at trial. It was very clear that A.H. felt some strong compulsion to get these
statements to the jury, even if she just had to blurt them out. Did she know or suspect that if the
jury heard her say "drugged," they would be far more likely to convict?

s
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CONCLUSION

Daniel Ghormley has been sentenced for this, his first and only felony crime, to a term in
the Idaho State Penitentiary for twenty years. The case was charged and presented as one in
which A.H. drank too much alcohol and therefore could not give valid consent for sexual
contact.

To answer and defend that specific charge is hard enough without the purposeful

interjection into the trial by A.H. that she thinks she was drugged. This Court does not need to
be reminded of the very explosive nature of date-rape drug allegations in the media and in
society as a whole. The very mention of such a thing in front of jury is so powerful and so
prejudicial that we cannot expect a juror to be able to just hit the "delete" button and begin again
from a blank slate.
A.H. knew what she was doing when, without a question before her, and with no real
opportunity for defense counsel to repair the damage, she made sure the jury would be left with
the impression that this case was something that it was not. One is left with the following
question to ponder: If the deputy prosecuting attorney handling this case would have somehow
conveyed to the jury that this was a date-rape drug case, would the granting of a new trial be the
only remedy? If the answer is yes, than what difference does it make how the jury got the
information? The result is the same for Mr. Ghonnley, and that is a trial that no one can say was,
beyond a reasonable doubt, a fair proceeding.

s

For these reasons, Mr. Ghormley respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District
Court, grant a mistrial, and order that Mr. Ghormley get a new trial.
DATED this

--

day of May, 2013.
THE ROARK LAW FIRM

Douglas Nelson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

\
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Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
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By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, at the
post office at Hailey, Idaho.
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By telecopying copies of same to said attomey(s) at the telecopier number:
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